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his article critically surveys the legal regulation of Indigenous people’s cultural 
heritage in Western Australia and its operation within the framework of a 
Australia’s federal system of government. It also sets out the different ways in 
which Indigenous cultural heritage is conceptualised, including as a public good 
analagous to property of the crown, an incidental right arising from group native title 
and as the subject of private contract. There is no unified legal notion of ‘Indigenous 
cultural heritage’ in Western Australian law. Rather, Indigenous cultural heritage is 
governed by an ill-fitting array of unsatisfactory and contradictory sources of public 
law, made workable by the negotiation of private arrangements that vary markedly on 
both an individual and a regional basis.1 
 
CONFLICT OVER INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE IN WESTERN AUSTRALIAN HISTORY 
While this article is an analysis of current law rather than a legal-historical analysis, it 
is important to appreciate that conflict over cultural heritage is not now, and has not 
been in the past, a dry matter of resiling different views about the use and disposition 
of land or waters.2 Rather, disputes over heritage have proven to be defining 
moments in the history of relations between the Crown and Indigenous peoples in 
Western Australia. Notwithstanding enduring cultural stereotypes about the 
importance of the pastoral industry, it is mining and energy that exercises absolute 
dominance over the Western Australian economy. Within the political economy of the 
resources industry in Western Australia Indigenous cultural heritage has proven to be 
a highly volatile issue because of its potential to impede development.3 
An illuminating example is provided by the dispute over the Noonkanbah pastoral 
station, located southwest of Fitzroy Crossing in the Kimberley, which took place in 
1979-80. In 1976, the Noonkanbah pastoral lease was purchased for the Yungngora 
local Aboriginal community4 with the title vested in a statutory entity known as the 
Aboriginal Lands Trust. Soon afterwards, during the Kimberley minerals rush of the 
late 1970s, a tenement to conduct exploration for oil was granted to a multinational 
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corporation which proposed to drill an exploration well in the vicinity of Pea Hill or 
Umpampurru on Noonkanbah station. State investigation revealed that the area in 
question included a heritage site complex that was significant in both a religious and 
economic context.5 
The government rejected the investigation’s findings, and decided that drilling 
would proceed. A protracted conflict ensued, including legal proceedings, street 
protests, Indigenous blockades of the main highway in to the Kimberley, Union 
action, the personal involvement of both the Premier of WA and the Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs and various efforts at negotiation. All efforts to produce a 
compromise settlement failed. In August 1980, a convoy of forty-five trucks bearing 
the drilling equipment left Perth with heavy police escort. It smashed its way through 
the various protests and pickets. Upon the convoy finally reaching Noonkanbah 
station, the site was drilled. The exploration uncovered nothing of value. 
The Noonkanbah imbroglio galvanised considerable popular political opinion 
behind Aboriginal people in Western Australia. It was one of the catalysts for the 
ejection from office of the conservative State Government of Premier Sir Charles 
Court in 1982. ‘Noonkanbah, never again’ became a popular rallying cry and the 
various parties went to some lengths to give the phrase their preferred meaning: the 
State embarked on legislative change; the Aboriginal people of the region united in a 
powerful new institution known as the Kimberley Land Council and there was no 
doubt an increased caution and awareness (if not yet even rhetorical sympathy) in 
relation to Indigenous affairs on the part of the resources industry. In certain 
respects, the system for dealing with cultural heritage in Western Australia remains 
marked by a common view that future Noonkanbah-like conflagrations should be 
avoided, because of the debilitating human cost to all parties occasioned by that 
dispute.6 Nevertheless, other significant controversies have followed Noonkanbah, 
including the Swan Brewery,7 Marandoo,8 Argyle9 and Tallering Peak.10 
 
SOURCES OF LAW: OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERATED DIVISION OF POWER IN AUSTRALIA 
The regulation of Indigenous cultural heritage in Western Australia occurs in the 
context of interplay of Commonwealth and State legal regimes, within the 
constitutional framework of Australia’s federated system of government. The 
authority of the Crown in Australia is divided between the Commonwealth, which 
exercises specific powers, and the States, which hold the residual authority. Where 
there is an inconsistency between a law of the central authority and of one or more of 
the States, the Commonwealth prevails to the extent of the inconsistency.11 The 
domestic constitutional structure has long been understood as a key to 
understanding (and reforming) the shape of Indigenous affairs in Australia.12 Section 
51(xxvi) of the Commonwealth Constitution in its original form gave to the 
Commonwealth Parliament: ‘Power to make laws for the peace, order and good 
Government of the Commonwealth with respect to… the people of any race, other 
than the Aboriginal race in any State for whom it is deemed necessary to make 
special laws.’ The section was famously amended in 196713 to rectify the omission of 
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the ‘Aboriginal race’ with the result that the Commonwealth now possesses the non-
exclusive power to make special laws in relation to Australia’s Indigenous 
population.14 
 
Sources of Law I: The (WA) Aboriginal Heritage Act 197215 
Indigenous cultural heritage is not the subject of a specific head of power aggregated 
exclusively to the Commonwealth under the Constitution of Australia and accordingly, the 
States are free to pass legislation on the subject. Western Australia enacted its Aboriginal 
Heritage Act 1972 (WA) (AHA) in 1972 with the ostensible purpose of protecting places 
and objects of significance to Indigenous people, on behalf of the community.16 The 
manner in which the AHA functions is set out below.17 
The AHA establishes a central source of authority to record and regulate all dealings 
with Aboriginal places and objects of significance. This central authority has three 
elements: the relevant State Government Minister,18 the Aboriginal Cultural Material 
Committee [ACMC] and the Registrar of Aboriginal Sites. The ACMC is comprised of at 
least one anthropologist and the Director of the WA Museum is an ex officio member.19 
Otherwise it is made up of ‘persons, whether or not of Aboriginal descent, having special 
knowledge, experience or responsibility.’20 The functions of the ACMC include evaluating 
‘on behalf of the community’ the importance of places and objects ‘alleged to be 
associated with Aboriginal persons’ and where appropriate, ‘to record and preserve’ the 
traditional Aboriginal lore.’ The ACMC also has the role of recommending to the Minister 
places that, in the opinion of the ACMC, are of special significance to persons of 
Aboriginal descent and should be preserved, acquired and managed by the Minister. In 
evaluating the importance of places, the ACMC must have regard to certain criteria, 
including any existing use or significance attributed under relevant Aboriginal custom; any 
former or reputed use or significance which may be attributed upon the basis of tradition, 
historical association, or Aboriginal sentiment; any potential anthropological, 
archaeological or ethnographic interest; and aesthetic values. Any associated sacred 
beliefs, and ritual or ceremonial usage shall be regarded as the primary considerations to 
be taken into account in the evaluation of any place or object.21 In addition to its more 
specific functions, the ACMC must advise the Minister generally on the operation of the 
AHA.22 
The Registrar of Aboriginal Sites must be an officer of the relevant government 
department and he or she has the function of administering the day-to-day operations of 
the ACMC. In the fulfillment of his or her duties, the Minister is required to ‘have regard to 
the recommendations of the Committee and the Registrar’, but is not bound by them.23 
Some of the Minister’s decisions are subject to review by the Supreme Court.24 The AHA 
refers to various kinds of places of significance that are ascribed different levels of 
importance. These include ‘places of importance and significance where persons of 
Aboriginal descent have, or appear to have, left any object, natural or artificial object, 
used for, or made or adapted for use for, any purpose connected with the traditional 
cultural life of the Aboriginal people, past or present’;25 ‘sacred, ritual or ceremonial sites, 
which are of importance and special significance to persons of Aboriginal descent’;26 and 
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any place which, in the opinion of the ACMC, are associated with Aboriginal people and 
which are of ‘historical, anthropological, archaeological or ethnographic interest and 
should be preserved because of its importance and significance to the cultural heritage of 
the State.’27 Aboriginal sites of ‘outstanding importance’ may be made ‘protected areas’ 
and thereby accorded the highest form of protection available under the AHA.28 
Subject to certain exceptions, the AHA makes it illegal to damage any places or 
objects of significance, with any transgression rendering the perpetrator liable to 
prosecution. In proceedings for unauthorised alteration or dealings with any Aboriginal 
site or object, it is a defence for the person charged to prove that they did not know and 
could not reasonably be expected to have known, that the place or object to which the 
charge related was a place or object to which the AHA applies.29 Prosecutions are 
initiated and conducted by the State, rather than by Indigenous people themselves. In 
other words, it is at the discretion of Government whether or not to prosecute, a hurdle 
that may prove not inconsiderable. In any event, even where a prosecution is conducted 
and is successful, the penalties available under the AHA were, up until recently, very low 
indeed. However, in 2003 the penalties were substantially increased to a fine of up to 
$20,000 and nine months prison for an initial breach by an individual and fines of up to 
$50,000 for an initial breach by a corporation.30 
The right to excavate or to remove any thing from an Aboriginal site is reserved to the 
Registrar31 unless the owner32 has obtained consent to use the land in a way that would 
be prohibited without such consent.33 Thus, while it is generally illegal for non-Aboriginal 
people to in any way alter or deal with any site or object, such activity can be legalised by 
the Minister when a land owner makes an application to that effect.34 An application by a 
land owner to destroy or disturb a site is first considered by the ACMC, which makes a 
recommendation to the Minister who then may give or decline consent, or provide some 
conditional sanction. 
The AHA makes it the duty of the Minister to ensure that, so far as is reasonably 
practicable, all places in Western Australia that are of traditional or current sacred, ritual 
or ceremonial significance to persons of Aboriginal descent should be recorded ‘on behalf 
of the community’, and their relative importance evaluated so that the resources available 
from time to time for the preservation and protection of such places may be co-ordinated 
and made effective.35 Any person who has knowledge of the existence of any thing in the 
nature of Aboriginal burial grounds, symbols or objects of sacred, ritual or ceremonial 
significance, cave or rock paintings or engravings, stone structures or arranged stones, 
carved trees, or of any other place or thing to which the AHA applies or to which the AHA 
might reasonably be suspected to apply, shall report its existence to the Registrar, or to a 
police officer.36 The reporting enterprise extends to Aboriginal cultural material of 
traditional or current sacred, ritual or ceremonial significance regardless of where it is 
located.37 The Registrar is required to maintain a register of places and objects that 
records all protected areas, all Aboriginal cultural material; and all other places and 
objects to which the AHA applies.38 A partial exception to these rules is that the AHA 
does not require Aboriginal people themselves to disclose information or otherwise to act 
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contrary to any cultural prohibition.39 The AHA also establishes a scheme for the 
regulation of commercial dealing in Aboriginal cultural material.40 
The AHA then, does not create or recognise rights in cultural heritage vested in 
Indigenous people and neither does it impose any positive obligation on developers 
of land to engage with traditional land owners with a view to protecting areas of 
significance. Rather, the AHA creates a fairly weak regime to regulate what is 
conceptualised as a public good. The basal principle underpinning the AHA is that 
there is a broader community interest in the regulation of Indigenous heritage, to be 
subject to the supervening imperatives of government and private developers. In 
practice, the administration of the AHA is neither properly resourced nor zealously 
enforced. The Western Australian Department of Indigenous affairs possesses a 
negligible investigative capacity and has completed very few prosecutions. 
 
Sources of Law II: Common Law Native Title and the (Cwth) Native Title Act 
The common law doctrine of native title was belatedly recognised in Australia in 
Mabo & Ors v Queensland (No.2)41 (Mabo), decided in 1992. However the Mabo 
judgments did not, of course, provide a framework for the integration of native title 
into the Australian property law system. The Commonwealth Labor Government of 
Paul Keating was faced with the choice of either taking a national approach, or 
allowing the various State parliaments and Supreme Courts to adopt separate 
approaches to the assimilation of native title into existing legal structures. After 
heated and lengthy public and parliamentary debate, the Commonwealth Native Title 
Act 1993 (Cth) (NTA) was passed in late 1993 in reliance on a number of heads of 
Federal power, including race and external affairs.42 The NTA did not, of course, 
provide a complete answer to all of the uncertainties arising from the Mabo decision, 
but it did introduce a comprehensive system for regulating dealings between native 
title claimants and holders and other parties with interests in land. Following the 
defeat of the Keating Labor administration by the Howard Conservative Coalition in 
1996, the NTA was subject to considerable amendment, but the essence of the 
statutory machinery remained the same.43 
Under the NTA, a claimant application for a determination of native title is made 
to the Federal Court of Australia, which then generally refers the claim off to 
mediation, which is conducted by the National Native Title Tribunal.44 The mediation 
is between the native title claimants and, potentially, every other party that has an 
interest in the land and waters covered by the native title claim. All levels of 
government have standing to be party to the mediation, whilst other parties include 
resource companies, pastoral leaseholders, developers and fishing interests.45 The 
purpose of mediation under the NTA is to achieve a determination of whether native 
title exists , if so, who holds it and how it interrelates with other interests within the 
claim area.46 If mediation reaches an impasse, the claim must be concluded before 
the Federal Court by litigation.47 
The processes for determining whether native title exists are lengthy.48 Mindful of 
the need for life to go on whilst native title claims remained unresolved, the 
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Commonwealth Parliament created a second procedural stream for dealing with the 
immediate tenure needs of governments and third parties. Once a native title claim is 
lodged with the Federal Court, the Registrar of the National Native Title Tribunal 
applies a registration test consisting of both formal and substantive criteria.49 A claim 
that passes the registration test obtains valuable procedural rights in respect of non-
indigenous parties who wish to perform acts affecting native title on land subject to 
the native title claim. Chief among the procedural entitlements obtained as a 
consequence of the registration of a native title claim is the ‘right to negotiate.’50 
Under the NTA a right to negotiate accrues to registered native title claimants in 
relation to the creation of a right to mine, over the land that is subject to the claim in 
question. The compulsory acquisition of native title rights and interests by the 
government is referred to by the NTA as a ‘future act’.51 The native title claimants, the 
government party and the future act proponent to whom the government is proposing 
to grant the tenure are required to negotiate in good faith with respect to the 
proposed future act in question for a minimum period of time. If the negotiations do 
not result in an agreement then the matter may be referred to the National Native 
Title Tribunal which, in an arbitral capacity, will decide whether the act can go ahead 
and, if so, under what conditions. Apart from the right to negotiate, a litany of lesser 
procedural rights exists under the NTA in respect of other kinds of future acts. The 
right to negotiate is the strongest procedural safeguard that exists under the NTA, 
however it does not provide the native title claimants with a right of veto, or impose a 
requirement on the developer to obtain the traditional owners’ informed consent.  
The right to negotiate itself is capable of complete abnegation by an ‘expedited 
procedure’ if the government is of the view that certain statutory pre-conditions have 
been satisfied. 52 In a sense, the term ‘expedited procedure’ is ill-chosen, because 
the expression refers to the absence of the right to negotiate, rather than a mere 
abbreviation. The application of the expedited procedure is signified by the state 
issuing a notice to that effect because it regards the grant of the tenement in question 
as satisfying criteria set out in s237 of the NTA. There is then a period in which native 
title claimant groups are eligible to object to the application of the expedited 
procedure.53 If there is no objection then the tenement in question will be granted 
without further delay. Under s 237, an act is one attracting the expedited procedure if 
it: 
 
(a) is not likely to interfere directly with the carrying on of the community or social 
activities of the persons who are the holders of native title in relation to the 
land or waters concerned; and 
 
(b) is not likely to interfere with areas or sites of particular significance, in 
accordance with their traditions, to the person who are the holders of native 
title in relation to the land and waters concerned; and  
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(c) is not likely to involve major disturbance to any land or waters concerned or 
create rights who exercise is likely to involve major disturbance to any land or 
waters concerned. 
 
The Western Australian government has always considered that all exploration and 
prospecting licences for mining should attract the expedited procedure and does not 
exercise any discretion in relation to each individual grant. Prospecting licences have 
a maximum area of 200 hectares with a term of four years and permit the prospector 
to extract or disturb up to 500 tonnes of material from the ground. The Minister may 
approve extraction of larger tonnages. Exploration licences allow for an area of a 
minimum of 1 graticular block (approximately 2.86 square kilometres or 286 
hectares), up to a maximum 70 graticular blocks (approximately 197 square 
kilometres or 19,700 hectares). The term of an exploration licence is 5 years and the 
Minister may extend the term in certain circumstances. The holder of an exploration 
licence may extract or disturb up to 1000 tonnes of material from the ground and the 
Minister may approve extraction of a greater amount. In the conduct of the 
exploration or prospecting activity the proponent can drill, excavate costeans, dig test 
pits, blast, clear overburden, create roads or tracks, clear seismic lines and, if 
required, build floor camps. Clearly, significant environmental and aesthetic change 
will occur as a result of the standard activities involved in exploration and 
prospecting. 
If a registered native title claimant group does not accept the exercise of the 
State’s judgment that an act is one attracting the expedited procedure, then an 
objection may be made to the National Native Title Tribunal acting in an arbitral 
capacity. The Tribunal will then conduct an inquiry into the objection, proceedings 
which are are adversarial in their nature, with the government, the native title 
objectors and the tenement applicant (known as ‘the grantee party’) as parties. If the 
Tribunal decides that an act does not attract the expedited procedure, then the full 
right to negotiate will apply to the grant of the tenement in question.  
Thus, the expedited procedure directly deals with the interaction of Indigenous 
peoples and third parties in relation to cultural heritage. Concomitantly, objections to 
the application of the expedited procedure are often lodged with the protection of 
heritage being the principle imperative. Obejctions are most often resolved through 
an agreement between the grantee party and the native title party, that the grantee 
party will fund an Aboriginal heritage survey in order to ensure that no archaeological 
or ethnographic sites of significance are disturbed when exploration or prospecting is 
occurring.  
The purpose of the procedural rights obtained upon the registration of a native 
title claim is to roughly maintain the status quo until the application can be finally 
decided with a determination in rem made by the Federal Court. The statutory 
scheme to maintain the status quo has particular resonance in relation to the 
preservation of heritage, because of its status as a core native title right. In Hayes v 
Northern Territory54 (also sometimes known as ‘the Alice Springs Case’) it became 
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clear that a determination of native title could include the right to protect Aboriginal 
heritage. Indeed, Justice Olney stated that any ‘form of native title which did not 
recognise the need to protect sacred and significant sites would debase the whole 
concept of recognition of traditional rights in relation to land.’55 
 
NATIVE TITLE AND HERITAGE: TWO SOURCES OF LAW BUT ONE RELATIONSHIP 
The operation of the AHA and the law of native title intersect in relation to Indigenous 
cultural heritage in an uncomfortable overlay of State and Federal legislation. The 
AHA and the NTA both deal with Aboriginal heritage: but conceptualised in very 
different ways and administered under separate statutory mechanisms. The elapse in 
time between the passing of the AHA in 1972 and the NTA in 1993 partially explains 
the incoherent relationship between the two statutes. The generation between the 
passage of the NTA and the enactment of the AHA saw vast changes in relation to 
the place of Aboriginal people in Australian society. Native title is also, in its origins, a 
creature of common law doctrine now regulated by Commonwealth legislation, 
whereas the AHA is a beast of statute. Such protection as the AHA offers to heritage 
is not vitiated by changes in land tenure, or the nature of the local Indigenous people. 
Native title, on the other hand, is extinguished by inconsistent tenure and will only be 
recognised to exist where the Indigenous group in question is sufficiently traditional 
and can satisfy the elements of proof.56 Unlike the AHA, which gives a protective role 
to an external authority, the NTA created the ability for native title claim groups to 
pro-actively intervene in order to preserve their own heritage. Native title and 
statutory Aboriginal heritage, even though they partly concern the same subject 
matter, are markedly different in terms of nature and origin.57 
The existence of separate cultural heritage and native title laws is often 
considered to be unsatisfactory by both traditional owners and resource interests. 
Indigenous people appear to find the arbitrary division of their relationship with their 
country in to either ‘native title’ or ‘heritage’ to be puzzling, perverse and inconsistent 
with traditional world-views. Resource interests are often frustrated by the 
requirement that they comply with dual processes, with distinct approval procedures, 
when dealing with the same Indigenous people in the same area. However, both sets 
of stakeholders have also, to some extent, managed to adapt to the institutional 
circumstances in an opportunistic manner. Traditional owners use native title to 
bolster heritage rights and AHA processes to augment their bargaining power under 
the NTA. Resource interests use delays arising from native title to ‘park’ tenements, 
thereby avoiding any legal obligation to expenses on tenements while still maintainig 
priority over ground.58 
 
MANAGEMENT OF INDIGINEOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE BY PRIVATE ARRANGEMENT 
Indigenous cultural heritage only comes under threat when the Government or a third 
party wants to use or develop land and it is such occasions when there is potential 
for conflict. The AHA and the NTA both mandate processes for resolving quarrels in 
relation to Indigenous cultural heritage. However, while parties are required to adhere 
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to statutory processes, the principal manner in which disagreement over cultural 
heritage is resolved in Western Australia is by private arrangment. Contracts for the 
resolution of heritage issues sometimes involve a government party, but most often 
are simply between a registered native title claim group and an individual resource 
interest. This section of the paper discusses the role of private contracts in managing 
Indigenous cultural heritage and containing conflict over competing land uses. 
The guiding philosophy underpinning the NTA is that the preferred way of 
resolving disputes between native title claimants and other interests is by mediation 
or negotiation leading to agreement. Indeed, there is consensus among all 
stakeholders that agreement, rather than disputation or litigation is the best way of 
resolving issues in relation to native title.59 As a matter of practice, many hundreds 
and possibly even thousands of agreements have been reached since the enactment 
of the NTA.60 One of the principal subjects of agreements pursuant to the NTA is 
Indigenous cultural heritage. 
In Western Australia, it is significant that the AHA does not require development 
proponents to take any positive action. There is nothing in the AHA that requires 
users of land to undertake an Indigenous cultural heritage survey or any other 
preventative measure. Nor is there any real suggestion implicit in the AHA that users 
of land should attempt to reach agreement with traditional owners. The enactment of 
the NTA in 1993, offered a hitherto unprecedented opportunity to Indigenous people 
to get land users to enter into negotiations regarding Indigenous cultural heritage with 
a view to reaching agreement. The common pattern that emerged was that upon the 
State advertising its intention to grant a prospecting or exploration tenement, one or 
more registered native title claimants would lodge an objection. The objection would 
then be withdrawn if the proponent agreed to conduct an Aboriginal heritage survey. 
Thus, an entire world of quasi-litigation, procedure and agreement-making came into 
being in response to the inadequacy of the AHA in protecting Aboriginal heritage, to 
give traditional owners a say in the process. 
In 2001, Western Australia’s newly elected Labor Government an inquiry into the 
State’s participation in the future act system known as the Technical Taskforce on 
Mineral Tenements and Land Title Applications. The Taskforce, chaired by Mr Bardy 
MacFarlane, a Member of the National Native Title Tribunal eventually released a 
discussion paper. Amon the findings of the Technical Taskforce was the 
recommendation that the State should encourage the development of template 
agreements, to be negotiated by peak native title and industry bodies acting 
collectively in a ‘Heritage Protection Working Group’ (HPWG). 
It was a hopeful and ambitious strategy to think that peak industry groups and 
native title bodies would be able to agree on regional template agreements. The 
negotiation of the precedent agreements proved to be lengthy, bitter and arduous. 
The content of negotiations also quickly became markedly regionalised. The NTA 
provides for the recognition of Aboriginal corporations as native title representative 
bodies (NTRBs), which function as specialist legal aid service providers to traditional 
owners. Western Australia is divided between five NTRBs known as the Kimberley 
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Land Council, Ngaanyatjarrah Council, the Yamatji Marlpa Barna Baba Maaja 
Aboriginal Corporation, the Goldfields Land and Sea Council and the South West 
Land and Sea Council. It is not compulsory for native title claimant groups to be 
represented by NTRBS, but the majority (in Western Australia at least) do chose that 
option.61 
Very different heritage protection practices had emerged within each of Western 
Australia’s NTRB regions by 2001 with the five NTRBs adopting dissimilar standards 
for acceptable minimum procedures. The regional differences in relation to heritage 
standards were caused by variations in the historical and cultural circumstances of 
each NTRBs’ constituents, the kind of pressures applied to the region by industrial 
and resource development, professional capacity of the NTRBs and so on. In the 
Yamatji (Pilbara, Murchison and Gascoyne) region for example, the YMBBMAC had 
created a stripped down heritage protection agreement, which – at only four pages in 
length – was designed to be user-friendly to even the small prospector. The guiding 
ideal behind what became colloquially known as the ‘four pager’ was to express the 
essence of heritage protection concisely and bluntly, to be read and signed like a 
licence application. The four-pager had, by 2001, largely become the norm within the 
Yamatji region and was widely accepted within industry. 
The HPWG process crystallised regional differences and by the middle of 2003, 
distinct agreements had been concluded for use in four of the five regions.62 In each 
case the template agreement represented a genuine compromise for all parties. 
Grantees are now required to prove that they have signed the appropriate standard 
heritage agreement for the region in which they seek tenure, before their tenement 
application will be submitted to the expedited procedure process under the NTA. If no 
heritage agreement has been signed by the grantee, then the State will not apply the 
expedited procedure and the application will go through the NTA right to negotiate 
process. 
The HPWG negotiations largely revolved around what threshold of ground 
disturbance (bearing in mind the range of activities authorised under exploration and 
prospecting licences) would necessitate a heritage survey, and what form the 
heritage evaluation would take. Critically, as there is no accepted industry, statutory 
or academic standard for Indigenous cultural heritage surveys, the HPWG 
negotiations were not grounded in any objective standard of reasonableness or 
proportionality. The two professions involved in the conduct of surveys, 
anthropologists and archaeologists, are largely unregulated. As a consequence, 
there is a wide divergence in the kind of methodology that is adopted by heritage 
practitioners. Broadly speaking, some methodologies are seen to favour Indigenous 
interests more than others by retaining knowledge for longer and releasing 
knowledge in incremental fashion. Conversely, methodologies which provide for 
more information to be given to resource interests on an up-front basis are seen to 
be more favourable to project proponents. There are a range of Indigenous heritage 
survey methodologies of common currency in Western Australia: 
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Work Program Clearance Methodology 
As a general rule Working groups prefer to advocate the Work Program 
Clearance model, where claimants are giving “informed consent” to the use of 
their land and the exploration working methods to be used upon and over it. 
The aim of the Work Program Clearance survey is to ‘clear’ a specific Work 
Plan, which details the exact locations of all ground disturbance activities (eg. 
Drill holes, access tracks, work camp and other facilities). These types of 
surveys are suitable for most exploration work, and all development in areas 
with the exception of actual mining or other activities that require 
intensive/expansive ground disturbance. This model of survey clears, or 
otherwise, specific work areas in relation to specific work programs only. 
Traditional Owners retain the right to withhold cultural information other than 
that necessary to indicate which areas of a Work Program are cleared, and 
those which are not. 
 
Work Area Clearance 
The aim of this type of survey is to ‘clear’ an entire allocated area in order for 
development to proceed, without Aboriginal people having to divulge anything 
but the most rudimentary information. These surveys are suitable for smaller 
areas of land to be cleared without the need for detailed survey work. In the 
field this requires an ethnographic survey team working with company 
representatives to determine on-the-ground areas that are cleared, or some 
mutually acceptable alternative. It also identifies areas that are not cleared. 
Sites/cultural features are not recorded in detail and no assessment is made 
of their significance. Site boundaries or buffer zones, placement of certain 
infrastructure would normally be recorded. In all other respects the survey 
method and consultation process is the same as for Work Program 
Clearance model. 
 
Site Identification Methodology 
In this model a survey team aims to record any sites, cultural features or 
places of special ethnographic interest in a survey area. The recording is of a 
detailed nature, and aims to give statements of significance on any sites 
recorded, and record other relevant cultural information and comments 
regards the survey area. The recording is at a level suitable for section 18 
applications under the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972. Some of this information 
may be restricted to a closed report. This type of survey is suitable prior to 
the (proposed) development/mining of large areas, and after initial exploration 
and Work Program Clearance surveys have been conducted, or for small 
areas with known sites recorded at Clearance or Avoidance level (as 
described above). 
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‘Best Fit’ or ‘Fit for Purpose’ Surveys 
Often a particular project requires an amalgam of survey strategies. Eg over 
an expansive area of Work Program Clearance model will be followed, except 
for one small area in which for, say, engineering considerations, a particular 
rail link or water pump must be placed in a set location. In that case, for that 
specific area only, a Site Identification strategy (at section 18 level) may be 
employed. These are pragmatic strategies to get around the real life world of 
survey work/development proposals. The decision on these matters may be 
made by the Working Group for the claimants. 
 
Site Avoidance Survey 
This is an ambiguous term, which means different things when used by 
different people. In general, it just means any type of survey where the 
proponent agrees to avoid sites, and that recording is therefore minimal. 
Consequently it could be either Work Area Clearance, or Work Program 
Clearance, or even a Site ID model (detailed recording with statement of 
significance), but where the proponent agrees to avoid the site in the short 
term. Because the methodology is not specified, the term is not really a 
method, but a concept of “We agree to avoid it, but don’t agree how the 
survey should be conducted”.63 
 
There are of course also numerous hybridised versions of Indigenous heritage 
survey methodologies. 
The regional template agreements were negotiated by the NTRBs, not by 
individual registered native title claim groups. Accordingly, in the Yamatji region for 
example, once the HPWG template had been agreed at a summit level, it became 
necessary to present the agreement to each individual group for ratification. When 
considering whether to adopt the HPWG agreement, most native title claim groups 
indicated an ongoing preference for the ‘four pager’, but also agreed that the new 
template would be acceptable. The HPWG agreements are now in large scale 
operation throughout the State. 
 
INDIGENOUS LAND USE AGREEMENTS 
The NTA contemplates a broader form of agreement known as an Indigenous Land 
Use Agreement or ‘ILUA’.64 The ILUA provisions in the NTA are intricate and not 
specifically concerned with Indigenous cultural heritage. In essence, ILUAs are 
significant because they give the parties the ability to effectively contract out of the 
procedures under the NTA, creating what is, in effect if not name, private beneficial 
legislation. Given their qualities, it is obvious enough that ILUAs can provide a 
mechanism for dealing with Indigenous cultural heritage on a claim wide or regional 
basis. The National Native Title Tribunal maintains a register of ILUAs which is open 
for public perusal.65 
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MAJOR PROJECT AGREEMENTS 
Most mineral exploration does not result in the discovery of a commercially viable 
resource. However, where a company does discover a feasible ore body, or when 
government seeks to compulsorily acquire land for a development, more complex 
heritage issues arise. In the exploration phase, resource interests will generally be 
able to avoid damage to Indigenous cultural heritage. However, where large scale 
disturbance of land is involved, avoidance will not be possible. So, what happens if a 
significant Indigenous site is located right on top of the ore body? 
The NTA offers the right to negotiate as a means for the parties to resolve any 
dispute. While it is technically feasible that a mine will not be permitted to proceed 
under the right to negotiate process, during the 12 years in which the NTA has been 
in force no project has been halted. Similarly, the AHA does not provide any 
mechanism to stop a mining project. In the absence of any ability to veto 
development, registered native title claimants are left with the unenviable choice of 
pragmatically negotiating the best agreement possible in the circumstances, or 
fighting the proposed project to a bitter, and almost inevitably unsuccessfull, end. 
Unsurprisingly, most traditional owner groups faced with such dilemmas opt for 
reaching an agreement. 
Major project agreements will usually include some or all of the following 
elements in relation to Indigenous cultural heritage: 
 
• Surveys to be conducted for the avoidance of Indigenous cultural heritage as 
far as is possible; 
• Payment of compensation; 
• Protective arrangements such as fencing and signage; 
• Induction practices for employees and contractors designed to achieve 
respect for heritage; 
• Salvation and mitigation work; 
• Indigenous heritage monitors on hand for ground-disturbing work; 
• Commitments to not apply under s16 or s18 AHA, without prior notice to the 
registered native title claimants; and 
• Establishment of a monitoring and liaison committee.66 
 
The payment of compensation to traditional owners has, not surprisingly, proved to 
be a controversial matter. There is no official rate for compensation for future acts 
under the NTA and there is no common law guidance as to how damage to native 
title or Indigenous cultural heritage is to be valued.67 There is a voluminous literature 
that speculates how native title might be valued, but it generally proceeds on the 
basis of application of principle, rather than the more laissez faire atmosphere that 
attends future act negotiations. Most negotiations and agreements over major 
projects are confidential to the parties, so there is not even a developed set of 
precedents based on actual negotiated outcomes.68 In essence, native title claimants 
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will want compensation to be as high as the project can bear, while the proponent will 
generally want it to be as little as decently possible.69 The actuality of such a dynamic 
is problematic within the context of popular discourses of the noble and spiritually 
uncompromising Aborigine, compounded by a general lack of awareness amongst 
the public of the severe limitations inherent in the right to negotiate.70 
Perhaps the most famous dispute over Aboriginal cultural heritage in the in 
Western Australia since Mabo concerned the compulsory acquisition of native title 
over areas of land on or around the Burrup Peninsula near Karratha in Western 
Australia. The acquisition concerned an area of world-renowned heritage 
significance, described by some as having the richest concentration of rock art in the 
world. The land was required for the creation of a multibillion dollar industrial 
complex. Lacking any capacity to veto the compulsory acquisition, the native title 
applicants negotiated the best agreement possible in the circumstances, whilst 
attempting to minimise the impact on their cultural heritage. While the development 
inevitably involved the mass destruction of cultural sites of significance, it also 
included very significant provisions for the management and maintenance of what 
remained, as well as substantial compensation. It was a highly successful outcome in 
the circumstances, though it attracted considerable controversy. The resulting 
agreement is one of the most comprehensive and largest scale of any negotiated 
between Indigenous people and governments in Australia. Unusually, and because 
the agreement was with the State of Western Australia, its provisions are entirely 
within the public arena. Ironically though, the Burrup Agreement retains no provisions 
dealing specifically with Indigenous heritage, simply allowing for the operation of the 
general law.71 
 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Agreements, of course, do not always fulfil the desires of the parties and general law 
remedies will apply when one party or another breaches a contract in relation to 
Indigenous cultural heritage. However, agreements with Indigenous people have, on 
the face of it, proved remarkably likely to command the adherence of the parties. 
Since 1992, there has been only a single reported instance of a party being sued for 
breach of an agreement over Indigenous cultural heritage. 
The dispute in Duke v Carriage72 stemmed from an agreement negotiated 
between a predecessor in title of the defendant known as the Eastern Gas Pipeline 
Company and various native title claimants on the other part, including the applicant. 
The subject matter was the Eastern Gas Pipeline, to be constructed along a 
substantial proportion of the Pacific coast of Australia. Among other things, the 
agreement between the parties provided that at all stages of construction involving 
land disturbance (clearing, grading and trenching), the proponent would employ an 
Aboriginal archaeological consultant and two Aboriginal monitors. 
Dispute between the parties was with respect to what constituted a ‘land 
disturbance’ and so gave rise to the relevant obligations on the part of the proponent. 
Specifically, a dispute existed over whether back-filling a trench could constitute a 
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land disturbance. The Supreme Court of NSW found that there was an arguable case 
for the plaintiffs, holding that it was clear that damages were not an adequate 
remedy, because the agreement was an equitable contract73 and the cultural 
significance of what might be lost could not easily be assessed in money by way of 
damages. 
 
INJUNCTIONS 
The AHA and the NTA together fail to provide traditional owners with the ability to 
satisfy aspirations to protect Indigenous cultural heritage in all instances. At times, 
Indigenous parties resort to attempts to obtain injunctive relief. In Djaigween v 
Douglas,74 the native title applicants attempted to obtain an interlocutory injunction to 
restrain the State of Western Australia from granting to the respondent a lease over 
the land for the purpose of a crocodile farm. In Bropho v Ball,75 the applicants sought 
an interlocutory injunction to restrain pile driving work being carried out in the Swan 
River on the basis that part of the river in question was a sacred area which the 
construction of a jetty would damage. In each of these instances, the application for 
an injunction failed. There is no case where a court has yet granted an injunction on 
the basis that the registered native title applicants may have their sites damaged if 
some activity goes ahead.76 
 
OTHER STATE AND FEDERAL SOURCES OF LAW 
The Heritage of Western Australia Act 1990 (WA) allows for the inclusion of sites of 
cultural heritage significance on to a Register of Heritage Places. The legislation has 
never been used to protect Indigenous cultural heritage, but appears broad enough 
to be applied to Aboriginal sites of significance.77 
The Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth) 
provides supplementary protection for Indigenous cultural heritage that is considered 
to be of particular significance and where protection is deemed within the ‘national 
interest’. 78 The Commonwealth heritage legislation has only been used very sparsely 
indeed in Western Australia and has not resulted in a single permanent site 
preservation declaration having been made. The Australian Heritage Council Act 
2004 (Cth) provides for the Australian Heritage Commission to recommend the 
protection of certain cultural heritage that is considered to be part of the ‘national 
estate’.79 A number of Indigenous sites in Western Australia have been included the 
Register of the National Estate.  A number of other Indigenous sites are recorded for 
the rest of Western Australia.80 However, inclusion of the Register of the National 
Estate does not entail any further legal protection. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Multiple sources of law govern Indigenous cultural heritage in Western Australia, 
spanning divisions in power between State and Federal authority and between 
statutory and common law. The inadequacies of the AHA from an Indigenous 
perspective are bolstered with recourse to the NTA and vice versa, in an endeavour 
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to create an overall Indigenous bargaining position of greater potency. The law of 
Aboriginal heritage in Western Australia is comprised of an ill-fitting pastiche of 
processes with the result that it its ambiguities are generally left for individual 
traditional owner groups and resource proponents to resolve through the negotiation 
of private agreements. In Western Australia, the ostensibly very public question of 
how Aboriginal cultural heritage, including the artefacts and regalia of internally 
sovereign Indigenous societies, should be dealt with at law is largely dominated by 
inter partes arrangements that are negotiated in private and remain confidential. 
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